THREE SCENARIOS ON THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD, EU, CZECH REPUBLIC

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Introduction

In 2010 the publication “Risky Future. Nine scenarios on the Czech society development” by authors from the Center for Social and Economic Strategies, Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University saw the light. The authors attempted on the occasion of 20th anniversary of the major political and economic changes in our country, with the aid of the scenarios to outline its future development in the widest political, economic, social and security implications. For CESES it was not the first time when a scenario method was used in order to, in the positive sense of the word "provoke", provoke thinking, considering and debating about the future. Scenarios in the "Risky Future" also provoke, but this provocativeness has been reflecting after two decades since 1989 a dynamic change of the world around us which was not imaginable not only a decade ago, but even just five years ago. A shift of a focus from world affairs in the transatlantic area on the East and South Asia has been no longer theoretical abstraction but more and more a reality, which directly has been affecting our lives, as well as the global economic crisis which has shaken also the EU, our main anchor in the multi-polar world forming, in which several other major poles of power and influence compete. The North-Atlantic Alliance which is besides the EU our second symbolic anchor addresses the difficult issue of its new raison d'être which was not, just 11 years ago when we joined it, obvious.

The team of authors of the Center for Security Policy CESES FSV UK has decided this year to continue the publication "Risky Future. Nine scenarios on the Czech society development" with three scenarios that could prompt a discussion about what might, under certain circumstances arise, to encourage the considerations on trends, situations and events which we might more or less face and which we might avoid if we thought strategically and, consequently, strategically governed and not only in the Czech Republic. If these scenarios come true, even partially, or not, the future will show. In any case the ambition of the authors is that the scenarios "Europe in the world without the West", Old continent facing new order" and "Czech Republic without strategic innovation ambitions" were to trigger the discussions and considerations on our future, how to face the challenges and threats which the future might bring.
EUROPE IN THE WORLD WITHOUT THE WEST – VIEW OF 2030

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Abstract
A scenario of the possible European and global development between 2010 and 2030, based on several key trends: the impact of the global economic and financial crisis on the status of the West in global governance, The rising importance of the new, non-western actors of global politics, the weakening of the security alliance between Europe and the US caused by disagreements over the solution of several regional security crises and over cost sharing within the NATO. Consequently, the NATO transforms itself into a new organization (the Trans-Atlantic Security Council). Simultaneously with the intra-NATO problems, crisis symptoms appear in the functioning of the EU, developing into three crises: The crisis of the Eurozone, of democracy and of global governance. Thanks to its strong 'soft power' potential, however, the EU manages to overcome these crises and play an important role in the new form of global governance, represented by the new character of the UN as a federation of influential regional organizations.

Keywords
Global economic and financial crisis, global governance, BRICS, G20, de-dollarizing military power, security disputes, NATO, the Trans-Atlantic Security Council, the European Army, crisis of the Eurozone, crisis of European governance, crisis of democracy, UN.

Not accidentally the Gonzáles report on the future of the European Union in 2030, which had seen the light just twenty years ago, mentioned the global economic crisis as one of the key threats to Europe. The reason for this was: In 2007 the economic and financial crisis arose in the US and it subsequently became global. Besides the United States, the Europe was most affected. In spring 2010, on the pages of the daily "Bible" of business and politics, the Financial Times, appeared the articles saying that "the credit crisis destroyed the belief in free market ideology" that "the world over the past three decades is gone," and finally by an unnamed banker from bank Merrill Lynch, that "our world is destroyed, and I honestly do not know what will replace it."

The question is what he then thought by "our world". If he thought "the West", he must have thought of Europe and the United States mainly as for centuries dominant actors of global political, economic and security developments, he was right. Global economic crisis has only accelerated since the beginning of the century a trend of shifting the focus of world affairs from the transatlantic area on eastern and southern Asia and also the growth of new regional powers.
on other continents. This was because especially China and other "Asian Tigers" were hit by the economic crisis much less and without bigger problems managed its impacts and on the contrary became, unlike the US and Europe, a source of further global economic growth.

In confrontation with a crisis that broke out just in the West, the feeling of skepticism has intensified in the countries of the "third world". These countries were for a long time not directly West's colonies nevertheless totally dependent states. Brazilian President Luís de Silvâ's summed it up sarcastically by noting that "the crisis was caused by the irrational behavior of white people with blue eyes, who had thought before the crisis broke out that they knew everything, and now it proved that they knew nothing."

Just the former president of Brazil was at the end of the first and at the beginning of the second decade of the 21 century man who, unlike bankers from Meryll Lynch, had an idea what will replace the banker's world. He was alongside with the Russian and Chinese president and prime minister of India one of the main protagonists of the global political and economic changes in the world. Four countries, Brazil, Russia, China and India, representing a significant human, economic and security strength and forming the BRIC group, became the major exponents of such global changes, which were to equalize "Non-Western" actors with the West politically and economically. At the same time the power of BRIC in the middle of the second decade multiplied by connecting South Africa and the transformation of the BRIC to BRICS.

The process of "equalizing" has been most markedly reflected by the establishment and activities of the G-20 bringing together the most advanced and most powerful economies in the world. G-20 which was at the end of the first decade the main global platform for the issue how to deal with the economic crisis and it has gradually transformed into a major global political, economic and security co-ordination body assuming the role of the G8, which grouped unlike G20 only the most advanced Western countries and Russia.

"Non-Western" actors, notably the BRICS group, received in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank more decision making powers. This was related to a long-term US economic crisis. During the second and at the beginning of the third decade of the 21 century it reached the situation that the profits of the USA from coining money (i.e. revenue from issuing money) turned from income to loss (i.e. the US currency began to return from the world), the dollar weakened significantly, which undermined the confidence in investments in other assets in the USA. The huge assets have started to spill into the "non-Western centers of power which have acquired an enormous stimulus to investments and thus economic power. Weakened United States have been still trying to stop or at least slow down this process of "de-dolarizing", but with little success.

One of the serious consequences of this development was the gradual weakening of American military power. The United States compared with the period of twenty years ago, in the third decade such a high military budget and large army could not afford to maintain. But to this day they have led the dance
through previously acquired technology in the world of the military, even though China has already started in some indicators of military power to catch them up.

Military weakening of the United States has also reflected in Europe – the USA with regard to their economic difficulties have decided to reduce significantly the military presence in Europe. Europeans have had to hear out with a surprise in the inaugural speech of the new US president in January 2017 the following words: "The United States have already had no reason to contribute significantly to the defense of a relatively affluent Europe from the restricted military budget. Europe has to take care more of funding its security”.

This conclusion was the result of a long process of USA-European security disputes, which concerned also the operation of the NATO.

Also part of the NATO member countries under the influence of the economic crisis limited the military budgets. It concerned also the NATO missile defense system, activated at the beginning of the second decade of the century, which was only possible with the support of the United States.

Another "roadblock" was Pakistan. After the success in considerable political turbulence in the NATO in 2016, two years later than it was planned to end direct and extensive military involvement of the NATO in this country through the agreement on ending the conflict between the Afghan government with the moderate Taliban, some European NATO members including Britain refused further engagement in the South Asian region, which was mainly related to the security neutralization of the unstable Pakistan. The United States had to intervene solely at the end of the second decade against a coup d'état, about which the forces of Al Qaeda tried in Yemen, and deploy their troops there. The US military had to return partially to Iraq, after the country had been gripped by another wave of sectarian violence, which was the result of the failure of the Iraqi political forces to agree on governance in the ethnically and religiously divided country. All these conflicts of "lower intensity" burdened the United States militarily and economically.

In a parallel with the NATO crisis also crisis symptoms occurred in the functioning of the EU. In the second decade, the EU was exposed to danger of disintegration in the form of three crises: crisis of “Eurozone”, "crisis of European governance" and "crisis of democracy".

The crisis of Eurozone was induced by difficulties to maintain a single currency in member states. These states differ significantly in the economic performance and financial discipline. The catalyst was at the end of the first decade of the century the Greek budget crisis. That one in the first half of the second decade negatively affected economic development in the Union. The Union, respectively the richer nations had to give considerable financial resources to avert national bankruptcy of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Further development of the Eurozone has been frozen, but the collapse of the single currency was not possible to avoid. The price for this was strengthening the supervisory role of the European Commission over the budgetary policies of member states and the increase of the significance of Germany in this process.
"The crisis of European governance" became apparent by pointed disputes on the decision-making powers in the European Union after approval of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. For this reason, the Union was not able in a number of international areas to clearly articulate their interests and then enforce them. The most visible it was in the relations with Russia, partly with China and in ensuring Europe's energy security.

The crisis of Eurozone and "Crisis of European governance" in individual EU Member States were also closely linked with "crisis of democracy." Their distinctive feature was the increasing importance of populist movements and parties offering straightforward solutions to complicated socio-economic problems, even at the expense of a European slowdown in integration or even liquidation of the EU. Overcoming these disintegration trends and processes was difficult. At the end of a second decade and at the beginning of a third decade a referendum on secession from the EU occurred in some EU states. However, in either case, citizens of these countries did not approve the secession even though in many states the result was narrow. This happened thanks to a few external circumstances which led the governments and citizens of member countries of EU to a more rational view of the existence of an integrated Europe.

The strongest impulse was the China's economic recession induced by widespread social tensions in Chinese society at the end of the second decade of the 21st century, which could endanger the EU economically. However, thanks to a stronger economic coordination in the EU with an enhanced steering role of the European Commission such a scenario was possible basically to avert and also adopt measures to face the further growth of the economically and politically "revitalized" China and other rapidly growing Asian and Latin American economies.

Security crises became the further impulses.

In the second half of the decade due to the disastrous drought in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, Europe was literally flooded by waves of tens of thousands of refugees from these regions. The Union weakened by disintegration processes that affected also the security forces, faced them only with great difficulties - the problem was not possible to eliminate until the extra ad-hoc deployment of police and military forces, particularly of large EU countries carried out. The experience of this crisis led to generating forces of humanitarian and security response of the EU.

In 2019, twenty years after the NATO's conflict with Yugoslavia, an armed conflict erupted between still not fully internationally recognized Kosovo and Macedonia, which at that time was, after the settlement of the dispute over the country-name with Greece, a NATO member and found itself in advanced stadium of talks about its membership in the EU. The background of the conflict was the effort to accelerate the creation of a "Great Albania" under the leadership of the Kosovar Albanians. Into the conflict in Kosovo entered also other member state of the NATO and a candidate for the EU membership - Albania. The conflict managed to "extinguish" when using the coordination of political and economic pressure of several key EU countries towards Kosovo (threat of total
economic embargo) and the declaration of a military mobilization in Bulgaria, Greece and Italy. However, the NATO in this conflict in fact remained aside, because the United States were not willing due to their involvement in other and for them more important conflicts to participate in its addressing.

The third conflict, which directly touched the European economic and political interests broke out in the Middle East two years later. The cause of the fifth Middle East war was the fight for water resources between Jordan, Syria and Israel. On their side besides other Arab states joined Turkey, the NATO member. It was supported by Iran, at that time already a great ally of Turkey. The Turkish policy this way further paralyzed the NATO operability.

The conflict, which due to the involvement of other Arab states extended to the entire Middle East, significantly disrupted oil production. Nevertheless after six months it managed to ward it off thanks to a coordinated approach of the United States and China, major consumers of oil from the region. Both powers used their political and economic influence on its key players (the US on Israel, Jordan and partially Turkey, China on Syria, Iran and partly Saudi Arabia).

During the conflict there was a significant reduction in oil exports including into the EU, which caused among others in summer 2021 all European energy blackout and subsequent economic recession. But it was the impulse accelerating the creation of truly common EU energy policy.

All crises in the security field, with which the EU was, in the range of almost seven years, confronted, led to fundamental decisions in security policy. The need for continental defense of Europe, namely even without the United States that began to withdraw from Europe, prompted the EU states leaders to consider building its own European armed forces - European Army. To this crucial decision the European statesmen were pushed due to unfavorable demographic situation of Europe. Ageing population in all EU member states significantly reduced the recruiting potential for armed forces. The need for merging of personnel, military capabilities and abilities became de facto the only way to preserve the relevant European military capabilities and to fulfill the ambition of the EU as a global security actor.

Yet not only considerations, but also a political decision on building the European Army at the EU summit for the 65th anniversary of the EU in 2022, also influenced the existence of the NATO. Considerations were given to its dissolution, nevertheless at the end thanks to the USA, Germany, France and Great Britain a political compromise was achieved: the alliance transformed to the Transatlantic Security Council (Trans-Atlantic Security Council - TASC) - an organization for political consultations on security issues between Europe and the USA. Furthermore, with regard to the new transatlantic security reality and the pressure of several influential European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) also Russia became the member of TASC. This way a long-standing political dispute in the "old" NATO on the possibility to allow Russia to enter the processes of political communication and decisions on issues of transatlantic security ceased to be relevant. The entry of Russia into the TASC was facilitated by the fact that Russia joined the NATO missile defense. It continued its operations after the
end of the NATO's existence on the base of special security agreement between the USA and the EU.

TASC was forced to work much more than the NATO before, how and by what means to counter the new threats that appeared in the world in the third decade of the 21st century. As the most urgent threats proved to be in the third decade three of them: the continuing degradation of the environment adversely changing and effecting the living conditions in big regions, the danger of global pandemics of serious diseases and the radicalization of large social groups frustrated by the unsatisfactory living situations and prospects. Threats ended up in the protests, which due to the rapid technological development took place more frequently in the cyberspace. Their goal was to paralyze particularly the information portals of the government agencies and supra-national companies which led to their paralysis.

Nevertheless TASC did not prevent further loosening of the transatlantic linkage. It was caused not only by more frequent different global, political, economic and security priorities of the United States and European Union but also by a gradual change of ethnic composition inside. In the USA strengthened the influence of Hispanic ethnicity and in Europe the influence of the population of the Islamic religion. Natural cultural and religious belonging of Europe and America receded therefore step by step into the background.

The EU in the third decade had to adapt more to a changing global environment. Despite internal and external problems it proved that Europe's "soft power", being built for seventy years (the rule of law, development of democracy and respect for human rights, the existence of an innovated welfare state, the emphasis on ensuring a clean environment, a leading global role in providing humanitarian and developing assistance) allows the union to remain in the third decade of the century, an attractive social, political and economic model.

By a stronger coordination of the European economy and building an integrate army the argument that the Union is a global power without state which was its biggest handicap against other global players ceased to apply. Therefore, the EU also stands its ground in the newly created reality of a global governance, where besides the operation of the G20 more and more significance is achieved by regional political, economic and security organizations which reflected also in the functioning of the UNO.

After several failures of a UNO reform, including the reform of the Security Council it gradually changed since the end of the second decade into a federation of regional organizations: the EU, TASC, the OAS, Mercosur, African Union, Arab League, the Council for Cooperation of Gulf Arab States, the SCO and ASEAN. The UNO in its current form began to be more operational in conflict prevention especially regarding energy and water resources that could significantly threaten global security and economic stability. A noticeable trend has been in this regard since the end of the third decade the direct military involvement of China in avoiding conflicts.

In 2030 the world is politically, economically and from the security point of view very fragile, nevertheless it succeeds to be the multilateral in
multipolar. The EU substantially contributes to this as it does not apply the policy of power but the policy of the influence.

Résumé

The scenario "Europe in the world without the west" models the possible development of Europe and the world in the two decades between 2010 and 2030 (a view of 2030). It is based on the premise that the development will be substantially influenced by the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis from the late 2000s. Hitting the US and Europe most, the crisis has accentuated the trend according to which the center of gravity of international political and economic affairs is shifting eastwards, the new global actors (BRIC + South Africa - BRICS) that try to gain more global political and economic leverage. The reduced military budget rendered the US more reluctant to bear as large a part of the responsibility for European security as in the past. Simultaneously, crisis symptoms appeared in the functioning of the NATO and the EU. NATO's operational readiness was diminished by the member states' differences over the resolution of certain regional conflicts (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kosovo and Albania, the Middle East). The EU faced three crises: The Crisis of the Eurozone, of European governance and of democracy, however, its still appealing "soft power" helped overcome them. After the NATO had transformed itself into the Trans-Atlantic Security Council, Europe began to build its own European Army, overcoming thus the handicap of being a "global power without a state". This enabled it to play a major role in the new form of global governance represented by the new character of the UNO as a federation of influential regional organizations.
THE OLD CONTINENT FACING A NEW ORDER

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Abstract

The period 2010-2030 in Europe passed without major disasters. Europe got stabilized and retained its global political influence and sustained the economic vitality. Though it suffered serious losses; mostly in environmental and societal dimensions. Vast areas of once cultivated countryside turned into deserted landscapes. Water shortages and declined biodiversity damage both the society and economy. Cities are crowded, losing social control. Middle classes are heavily deprived. The common rationality and European art of reflection have survived, however they are shared with fewer people and groups than decades ago.

Keywords
Scenario, foresight, Europe, environment, degradation, biodiversity, society, middle class, deprivation.

In retrospect, the period 2010-2030 does not seem to anybody particularly dramatic. Europe avoided major natural disasters, social, industrial and military. To the smaller ones, the European Union was able to respond effectively by already existing tools, functioning as subsidiary ones or it could quickly take the necessary measures and mobilize capacities.

Paradoxically, the Union, once criticized for slowness and the inability of an integrated energetic policy, became a proficient institution of crisis management. From the perspective of the outside world, Europe has undergone several crises: crisis of the Eurozone due to scheduling conflicts when dealing with burdens of individual economies, the crisis of European governance due to the resistance when filling up the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty and the broader crisis of democracy - because of boundless fatigue from the democracy and its chronic dysfunctions.

The twenty years were not for Europe either easy or much successful and above all, it did not manage without heavy losses. Some of them might be compensated in the course of time, but some of them have been devastating and irreversible. Global political influence of the EU has shown in the last two decades rather stabilization and consolidation as its dominant mobile voice has been gradually formed and as it sounded in the Lisbon Treaty - although even today it is not entirely monophonic. Union also has kept a strategic economic vitality no matter how its significance has been inevitably decreasing in a global market economy and in absolute rates is not able to keep pace with biggest competitors. The environment turned out much worse, having been damaged by the loss of species biodiversity and by degradation of inherited wealth of a European cultural
landscape. Similarly, substantial are social losses. The disintegration of public space has deepened, partial degradation of the middle-class towage-labor, public control over the use of technological advances has dropped and the decline of politics to the level of primitive populist campaigns illustrates the overall decline in social cohesion.

Just this latest loss has had a historical significance. Europe today is not worse than any other politico-economic "nodes" of the world. Thanks to its "soft power" (based on adequate economic and military strength) effecting on the outside and thanks to a flexible quasi-consensual authority generated inwards, the EU remains attractive as a political and economic model. Compared to the rest of the world it excels as a social model. Yet today Europe from the perspective of its most citizens fails to do what it was for generations aimed at and by what it inspired the rest of the world.

Changes of European landscape came about as a quiet, not involved background of a social development. Unfortunately they mostly mean its degradation, our ancestors from the country at the beginning of the 20th century would not recognize their homes today. A large proportion of small rural settlements are abandoned - and this applies from Ireland to Greece. This loss of cultural memory is in comparison with the period around the year 2010 already irreversible, and basically no agricultural recovery policy of poor rural areas succeeded. To cultivate the soil in a small scale in a remote region is simply not worth it. Much better only German-speaking countries and southern Scandinavia have been doing.

Already at beginning of the 21st century it was clear that global climate change will also affect Europe, though not as drastically as in Africa, Asia and Oceania. Most affected were Southern States of the EU where it rains only in the winter, while summers are the Saharan arid, hot and long. Dramatic changes also affected the farthest north, where tundra retreated away since the last ice age and in many places simply disappeared - as well as the islands of Arctic-alpine tundra in Central Europe. Less alarming in the last twenty years were the changes in the central zone of continental Europe. An overall warming, which we do not perceive so much due to the variability of the weather arrived. Much more serious is a radical shift in precipitation patterns - neither can we see any longer the spring and summer rains, almost all the water falls in winter. Therefore since 2018, each summer a long drought has arrived. The limits are set for water consumption for households, farmers and industry. For the first time in the last two centuries, agricultural yields have repeatedly declined.

In general, the biggest problems are with water. When in the summer exceptionally rains, there are torrential rains with storms that overflow the streams and rivers are often in several countries simultaneously. Today, the damage is relatively small, people since the 90th of the 20th century have been leaving the river floodplains, but also for years have been building houses, roads, bridges, but also factories which resist the raging water easily. Much more fundamental are problems with periodical drying out of rivers and streams also in places, where it even in 2010 sounded like a science fiction. Rivers in the summer have become
repulsive smelly sewers, which attract mosquitoes. This way, after 2020, malaria returned to the Balkans and occurred repeatedly in Hungary and the Slovak Republic.

Drying out of rivers have an impact on the industry, which due to alternative forms of cooling - water from rivers is either little or is so warm that it cannot be used - consumes far more electricity. And right in the summer, when the workload of a power system is traditionally the highest. Many European companies ultimately shift water- demanding production, such as paper mills, textile manufacturing and production of building materials to Russia and Canada.

We have already discussed changes in agriculture. The total amount of food produced in Europe neither dropped nor rose, but it is produced far more unequally than at the beginning of the 21st century. Quality land is now valued everywhere, because despite all the proclamations of governments and the European Commission the land was degraded even around 2010 by build-up areas - obviously most in the new EU member Sstates, where irresponsible and uncontrolled urbanization was directly related to corruption in public administration.

In the last two decades there really arose a phenomenon against which the environmentalists and scientists have warned long ago – rapid, locally selective loss of biodiversity. This went on for a long time discreetly, nobody paid too much attention to it and then suddenly there were local ecological disasters. These almost immediately cause the collapse of local agriculture. In Germany and France in 2024 and 2025 the insects invasions came repeatedly which had been before always kept under control by the winter weather and bird population. Now the yield of some crops vanished in afflicted regions and localities from 80-90 %. In other states regional collapses of some biotopes arose due to complex extinction of bees. An unbelievable amount of new kinds of amphibians and insects broke out. Just in Low Austria in the 20th years, several times a huge population of poisonous spiders broke out. The impact on tourism in Weinviertel and in Vienna itself was devastating.

Combining local impacts of climate changes with a simple apathy of officials, politicians and businessmen caused a situation which Europe has not experienced for centuries. Many places and regions where people had lived and farmed for generations, have become so in hospitable that they are now abandoned. The concentration of population is much more uneven than a century ago. The countryside is either heavily populated and economically exploited, or in large areas turned into a wilderness. And cities are overcrowded.

For the development of European society in the second and third decade, any general description cannot be used, since the degree of convergence between the old and new countries of the EU did not manage to eliminate economic and social differences. However, one common trend at that time paid for all of Europe, although its impacts and strength in the Eastern European countries were much greater: it was the growing pressure on the middle social classes. Sometimes it touched narrower middle class, sometimes classes of workers in general. Experts call this deprivation, also the term exploitation returned.
Nevertheless, in the last twenty years, the differences between the once income and status compact middle class deepened. It broke up into a narrow group of privileged professionals, whose positions in several most profitable sectors of the labor market bring them permanent securing, highly above average incomes and a lifestyle similar to the style of the rich. The other, far more numerous "rest" of the middle class is the army of educated and skilled employees, which is becoming frustrated wage labor force, constantly threatened by cheaper labor from the global East. Already at the beginning of our century the new proletariat in suits and ties was mentioned. All these undergraduates have dreamed about the fate of those who are looked for and dragged across companies who are offered generous benefits - instead of this it now takes them tens of years to repay the first family housing and the loss of job or illness in Central and Eastern Europe immediately endanger them that they will be centered in the zone of poverty. In Western Europe this fall is not as strong due to still lower percentage of expenditures necessary for the basic needs of households in total household expenditures.

The labor market in the first three decades of this century, shifted to a significantly higher flexibility. From there, the entire European Union economically benefits. With that, however, the level of protection of workers' rights did not increase.- and that is why today we have a model that German, French or Nordic employees and employers forty years ago would have named without hesitation Asian. The main feature is a constant struggle to maintain a job: not just for workers but also for the administrative, technical and economic officers and office leaders. Unfortunately, not in the least the European vision of the first decade came true; the vision on future increase of employability and greater participation of young people, women, elderly and disabled citizens. The demand from employers' side understandably did not appear and the states to enforce such measures more or less resigned, and the European Commission does not want to interfere the tense partnerships with well-organized private and corporate sectors.

At the same time the demand for labor still exists and in many sectors has been high for a decade or fifteen years - it is not caused by the growth or restructuring of the economy, but by rapidly aging generations of skilled workers and managers, and by a more and more significant population deficit. According to statistics, unemployment has never reached the tops of the economic crisis of 2008-2012. In many areas, at first in those low paid, the chronic labor shortage arose. Immigration has remained for decades the only solution and today the "Asianization" of European labor market also thanks to a direct support from the EU is less complicated than in the 20th century.

Between 2000 and 2030, the income inequality increased sharply in most European countries. Fortunately, the largest rank of employees still has persist above the poverty line. Moreover, the appealing image of "supra-middle" class up to now - at first glance, inconceivably and irrationally - controls the media information-entertainment space. Also that is why, no major riots or protests broke out. At least not from the people who go to work with a tie.
Completely different it was with growing groups of those socially excluded to more and more bussier edges of European cities - immigrants, ethnic and religious minorities, as well as numerous domestic populations of "old" Europeans, therefore families hereditarily "failed" - without a college education without stable jobs, without permanent income, without credits and insurance. One of the signs of declining social cohesion was the return of the real ghettos, and with them also structural violence. From originally wild excesses in the form of burning cars in France has become a normal thing - after the football as well as after shooting a demonstrator by the police. The one who now parks in the suburbs, already counts with this risk. Much more dangerous are the anonymous attacks of various radical groups and individuals. Explosive devices are nowadays usually detected in time, but around 2020 was the "fashion"of these brutal attacks, which came from the USA, quite shocking.

Overall, it is possible to state with a regret, that the trends towards disintegration of public space, which was obvious already at the turn of the 20th and 21 century, continued. One of the sad consequences is the decline of generally shared rationality. In connection with the bustling urban development and uneven changes in rural life it also came to the break up of traditionally shared and transmitted national cultures. Surprisingly well Eastern European nations held out in this wave of indifference to the own heritage. Just a logical consequence is the continuing misery of political culture - but it seems that its irrationality and demagoguery do not matters too much to the many of its observers. Depending on the maturity of traditional party politics in each country we still can see a very different degree of penetration of private economic interests in the political struggle and political projects. A traditional gentle dividing line between Scandinavia, Britain and Germany (and perhaps gradually Poland), where the interests are promoted openly, elegantly and without corruption in a primitive form, and with the rest of Europe, where public decision making is too much influenced by secret links - this line remains plus or minus still valid. Even after 70 years of the integration process ... The idea that the more stable political parties, the more transparent is the performance of the governance recent years have both confirmed and impeached. Exactly the same it is with purposefully formed election movements, where political ideology is replaced by a couple of strong slogans and strong support by a few tycoons.

If we ignore the overall insecurity of conditions for the middle class, there appeared also some very interesting societal forms, which now offer an alternative to the often frustrating, middle-class lifestyles.

Basically, there have always existed in the advanced market economies of Western Europe, islands with slightly different rules – the example is the famous Christiania in Copenhagen. The life outside the official rails worked even in communist countries and different alternative styles spread quickly after the democratization. Only during the past twenty years from a "marginal" life of families and communities, usually with minimal income, living in part on the periphery or in specific urban communities, or settled in the countryside or even in the wildlife, has become a fully established, respected and surprisingly extended
option. Authorities had conflicts with these communities in different countries, mostly due to the form of children's education. Much less mattered the fact that these congregations have survived mostly outside the regular market sector and the official fiscal economy. Especially after having been solved the involvement of these people in health and social insurance. Independent management of rural and urban communities without wages, taxes, credits enables a stable modest life. In addition, it does not build any barriers for the eventual transition to a "normal" civil-consumer system.

Another moment that was a step upstream, was in the period between 2010 and 2020, sporadic at first, but gradually more and more pronounced resistance of some business leaders - especially the bosses of large retailers and industrial companies - against the deepening of neoliberal reforms, especially those that weakened the low- and middle-income groups of inhabitants.

Apart from concerns and persistent effort to keep a decent job and decent income, Europeans are increasingly engaged in some of the things that actually give them a sense of meaning and continuity. Thanks to this, just after the economic crisis went off the civil sector was strengthened. The development of civil society was not as revolutionary for its continued viability throughout Europe since the fall of the Iron Curtain. More surprising was in the 20th years slight re-strengthening of the role of churches and further a significant increase in local and regional movements and initiatives focused environmentally, religiously, socially or economically.

Despite this wave of civic engagement, remains though, thirty years since the beginning of the century a problem of considerable alienation among some groups. So far growing Muslim community (in some countries rapidly growing) lives in most European countries in a more and more integrated manner, but first of all in political, administrative and of course in an economic sense; in everyday neighborhood coexistence it is separated. Muslims, whether native Europeans of a number of generations, or immigrants, are able to communicate routinely and act in the domestic political space. Partly in a form of traditional domestic political parties, which now accept the Muslim members without problems and in relevant localities also nominate them in elections, partly through many non-governmental organizations on local, national and wide European level. Isolation from the indigenous majority is therefore much more significant problem for Asian and African minorities. If it were not for the civil sector, state social support and compulsory schooling, many ethnic groups of citizens would have never met. Apathy in the chaos – so it is possible to characterize the coexistence of many ethnic and religious minorities with majorities. Alienation and isolation exist also, though between different segments of the domestic population - the localities burdened by "a culture of poverty" have been changing in the ghettos, into which most adults or children from successful families never have stepped in their lives. Fortunately, so far none of these ghettos have got completely out of the direct control of public power, its security forces and social services.

Characters that have formed a unique community with North America have weakened: the market, democracy and Christianity remain, but each of them
is impeached. The sound core of European culture which does not resign on the rational Enlightenment heritage, fortunately remained preserved - but not shared with everybody. Paradoxically it finally survived rather as the opposite and counterweight to more and more bustling commercially industrial cycle of production and consumption. This was started by Europe the other days just as a product of rational, Enlightenment and liberal ideology - in the last four decades, however, just this auto-motion of mass production and mass consumption began to run out of resources and exhaust socially, to damage politically and relatively to disadvantage in global economic competition. If Europeans want to succeed, they must through the European ability of reflection contribute to the search of stability, sustainability and peace for a little harebrained multi-polar world. Unfortunately, not all European nations are able to observe a wider horizon.

Résumé

The period 2010-2030 in Europe passed without major disasters. The EU, once criticized for slowness and incapability of concerted energetic action, became an efficient crisis management institution under the pressure of need. Today's Europe, thanks to its 'soft power' (underpinned by the corresponding economic and military strength) emanating outwards and thanks to the flexible, quasi-consensual authority generated within, remains attractive as a political and economic model. Against the rest of the world, it also stands out as a social and welfare model. However, a majority of European citizens in 2030 believe that Europe has not lived up to the goals for which it has striven for generations and which had inspired the rest of the world. Europe stabilized and retained its global political influence and sustained the economic vitality. Though it suffered serious losses, mostly in environmental and societal dimensions. Vast areas of once cultivated countryside have turned into deserted landscapes. Water shortages and declined biodiversity damage both the society and economy. Several European countries experienced regional collapses of certain biotopes due to sharp, territorially uneven decline in biodiversity, with sudden occurrence of local environmental disasters, followed by immediate collapses in local agriculture. Cities are crowded, with loosening social control. The disintegration of the public sphere has deepened. Middle classes are heavily deprived and largely turned into underpaid wage laborers. Socially excluded groups are differentiated from ethnic and religious minorities to native European urban underclass stuck in the poverty trap. Notwithstanding the generally less stable and secure living conditions for the middle class, some interesting social forms have emerged, offering an alternative to the often frustrating middle class lifestyle. The common rationality and European Art of reflection survived, however they are shared with fewer people and groups than decades ago.
CZECH REPUBLIC WITHOUT INNOVATIVE STRATEGIC AMBITIONS

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Abstract
The scenario starts with the premise of the riskiest approach to forecasting with the straightforward extrapolation of past trends. The example of the Czech history says: In the 20th century, the country saw ten major changes of the social and political system, including a serious economic crisis with political and social consequences and the breakup of the joint Czechoslovak state. Czechs therefore tend to respond to world affairs with caution. Still, from the perspective of 2030 it can already be said that despite the dynamics of our history and the riskiness of extrapolation, the 2010s and 2020s have been only an extrapolation of the previous development. In some periods, political power was being twisted to serve lobbyist purposes; laws were passed "on demand", e.g. with the AIM to obstruct activities strengthening democracy and standard political culture. This was opposed by that part of the public which identified itself with democratic and humanist ideals. Apart from the creeping resignation on ethical values, the country's development was retarded also by the lack of truly erudite politicians and the inability of the changing administrations to master the principles of strategic governance, i.e. governing and leading the country according to a long-term vision and strategic plans.

Keywords
Czech history, forecasting, extrapolation, human potential, the North Atlantic Alliance, European Union, the European Army, political parties, populism, apolitical politics, strategic governance.

The Czech history as an argument
In the prognostics the extrapolations of current development are probably the most trickiest. The forecasters would rather avoid them.

The argument is also the Czech history of the 20th century. In these ten were substantial changes in the social and political system or a severe economic crisis with political and social consequences and the fate of the common state.

The First World War started in 1914, after its end in 1918 the independent Czechoslovak Republic was born. Already within ten years in 1929 the economic crisis broke out, after which in 1933 Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. In 1938 the Second Republic was set in followed by the Nazi occupation and World War II in 1939. In 1945 we regained the freedom, but in less than three years in 1948 the political system changed and the establishment of communist power came
about. The attempt to return at least partial democracy in 1968 was stopped by the invasion of Warsaw Pact troops. Freedom and democracy have won in 1989, but in 1993 the common state of Czechs and Slovaks broke up and the Czech Republic came into existence. Major changes, such as joining the NATO and the European Union can be seen as an integral part of the post-November developments. **On average, every ten years there has been a serious socio-political change.**

If we wanted our recent history to periodize as in France, the Czech Republic would be the sixth: 1st Republic (October 28, 1918 – September 30, 1938), 2nd Republic (October 1, 1938 - March 14, 1939), 3rd postwar Republic (May 9, 1945 – February 24, 1948), 4th Socialism (February 25,1948 - November 16,1989), 5th post-November Republic (November 17, 1989 – December 31, 1992), 6th Czech Republic (January 1,1993 - present).

These key historical events were accompanied not only by joyful acceptance, as it was with the establishment of an independent state, double regaining of freedom and democracy, economic and social development, but also by people’s hardship, enormous human and material losses, which were caused by two world wars and totalitarian regimes with two occupations.

**There was a loss of human potential** due to insufficiently lawful leadership of the fight against so called Austrianism and collaboration, the displacement of even anti-fascist-oriented citizens of German nationality, a variety of verifications of persons, etc. In the course of the Second Republic the society was hit by dishonesties in the anti-Jewish and anti-intellectual chase and by various types of screenings. Also the decrease of qualification in the economic crisis and personal clean-out or reduction of territory occurred, and therefore also the decrease of the market during the break up of the Czechoslovak state.

**Czech reaction to the global and European development**

The refocusing of the world affairs from the Euro-Atlantic area to the eastern and southern Asia, the Czech public has not reflected too much and neither it has become a key agenda of political elites. Similarly, the global economic crisis has not concerned the citizens that much as well. The standard of living has not been reduced dramatically, China has been still far away, people stopped taking notice of the present Vietnamese.

When concurrently with the crisis of the NATO, crisis symptoms and functioning of the EU emerged and in the second decade the EU was exposed to the danger of disintegration caused by the crisis of the Eurozone, democracy and European strategic governance in particular member states, the Czech public after all became nervous. However, when a referendum was announced on a possible withdrawal from the EU, despite anxious expectations of Europe, our citizens in the EU mainly wanted to stay.

The Czech public in contrast to the attitudes towards missile defense, only indifferently responded to the gradual weakening of American military power and the withdrawal of troops from bases in Europe when the United States in the third
decade, could no longer afford to maintain a high military budget. The USA, however, thanks to previously acquired technological advancements sustained the global military primacy which the Czech professional public assumed.

Far more the Czechs were worried about the waves of refugees, especially from Africa. Although, the CR supported the uncommon deployment of police and military forces of large EU countries and the humanitarian aid, just as before, it got shut against the influx of migrants. CR was involved in the solving of the conflict between Kosovo and Macedonia, which should lead to the formation of Great Albania under the leadership of the Kosovar Albanians. The conflict was too close to the Czech Republic and the Czech citizens were frightened of the Islamization.

The CR supported the building of the European Army, missile defense and the Transatlantic Security Council – the organization for political consultations on security issues between Europe and the USA.

The development of Czech society and democracy

Despite the demonstrated dynamism in the prologue of our development and the precariousness of extrapolation in forecasting, from the 2030 point of view it was clear that essentially it was only the extrapolation of the current twenty-year development, here during years 1990 - 2010.

The CR, like in the first decade of the 21stcentury ensured after the crisis an annual GDP growth of around 3.5%, by which it basically managed to almost double the GDP in two decades.

The development was positive, optimistic, even if for someone with ideas for the CR as an economic tiger could have meant the disappointment.

In 2030 it was clear that what was anticipated, felt or supposed by a part of the political and academic elites - that the Czech Republic will develop in two decades after 2010 in a similar manner and with the effect as in the first two decades after the events of November, figuratively speaking, that there will be "a modest progress within the law."

We could have been more successful - in stable periods, we always had, being in a middle of Europe, a convenient location for a market economy and after the end of the Balkan conflict, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, we were, except the Kosovo-Macedonian conflict and refugee flows, in the area remote from critical security threats and risks.

In other words, from the homeland-political viewpoint in favor of the balance of political groups and their periodic replacement – once with the prevailing emphasis on individual motivation, and another time with the domination of solidarity - there was no significant catastrophic conflict. This was reflected also in a slightly increasing economic development, even in social structures.

A success was a further development of democracy, its partial intensification and improvement of political culture. This was not accomplished until 2020, by that time the state of democracy in the CR according to the
researches of the American non-governmental organization Freedom House was getting slightly worse, so it was lagging behind not only Western countries, but also behind some central and eastern European states.

Political parties focused mainly on the rapid acquisition of the power and they often did not work out solid programs not even for a four-year period of the electoral term. The electoral victory was often based on the fear factor of a return to communism or the fate of Greece and indebted generations of grandchildren or on unrealistic social promises, such as the thirteenth pensions and salaries, free transport to school children, demotivating social benefits, etc. and populist slogans. Voters decided rather in the sense of what they do not want than what they wish.

In the second decade of the 21st century, at first, traditional political parties with their clearly identifiable political programs gradually disappeared from the dominant position on the Czech political scene. Some of them for the mismanagement of social and economic reality of the early 21st century, and for adhering to "traditional values" disappeared from the political scene, despite their more than one hundred-year tradition.

They were experimentally replaced by new, generally apolitical parties and groups, with non-systematic populist programs using immediate, usually negative worries and feelings of significant groups of voters from the development of the society. Their attractiveness was based on deliberate and undisguised media marketing, on new or popular faces of mostly quickly installed leaders. Though, it was possible with high probability to suppose that with regard to the Czech political history they will have, similarly, as the many previous a short life, unless also in their name the authentic program will be reflected – e.g. the Conservative Party, Social Liberal Party, etc., but in existing actual political and economic context as relatively less poor than those worse caught attention and got often right for the first time with all consequences to the power.

The media campaigns were generally financed by powerful domestic and foreign businesses and their financial groups. This enabled them to get through democratic elections to political power. This development demonstrated, among other things precariousness of the theses of so-called "apolitical politics".

Politics as the art to administer public affairs, to govern the state, maintain its social cohesion and protect the interests of one state against another, create and maintain ties between the state on stable democratic and legal principles, was in the CR significantly weakened. In annual reports of the Security Intelligence Service annually appeared almost in the same way enunciated information: The most significant negative effect in the management of state assets have been efforts of some business lobbies and lobbyists to gain influence on important decisions in the management of state assets, in particular on the allocation of government contracts or subsidies. With this is also connected a strong interest of these groups to influence the legislative process and personnel occupation of decision-making positions in the government. These activities create the space for the outflow of sensitive or classified information, corruption, clientelism and corruption. As a result of a number of legal proceedings on the activity of state institutions or the
practice of the state, there are increased national costs when addressing incurred law-suits.

A serious role of politicians began to be played by lobbyists who acquired the art to manipulate people's minds and use their generally negative moods and feelings to the staged "election victory". This enabled them to appoint to the parliament and the government's positions personalities with the aim to ensure a close group of people the opportunity to promote the economic interests in conflict with the principles of democracy, rule of law and the country.

**Political power changed in favor of lobbyists, was promoted by purposefully adopted laws, including allowing penalty for actions aimed at strengthening democracy and realistic politics.** The democratic public opposed this as it still preserved democratic and humanistic ideals.

### Strategic Governance

A retarding factor after a two-decade period was besides continuing resignation on ethical values, particularly the lack of highly educated politicians and the inability of rotating executives **to acquire the basics of strategic governance**, i.e. the management and country government in accordance with long-term visions and strategic plans. There was also quite a legitimate skepticism whether politicians and political parties may, at a regular four-year electoral term risk the efforts at strategic governance.

Government ministries, despite the promised target or program management, mostly remained "independent" entities. Their activity was lacking strategic management at the state level and also coordination of activities in the economic, social, foreign-security and legislative subsystem of government execution.

Yet forty years after the fall of Communism persisted the resistance to planning, and therefore neither were created the foundations of strategic planning and management.

The absence of strategic governance in our country existed despite the fact that immediately after November 1989, it was elaborated a number of strategies, projects and programs that were not implemented due to the prioritization of economic transformation. A similar up-to-date document has not been over twenty years available. Strategic programs and plans were replaced by surface cuts ad hoc which in the campaign period were compensated by benefits aimed at specific social groups.

Reforms were shaped in an unsystematic way. Information on these measures was distributed to the public in a distorted form prior to their adoption which created an atmosphere of social insecurity.

Also personnel and government policies of political parties had retardation effects. Despite the existence of shadow governments and shadow ministers, to the head of departments were often appointed very different people, some of them got to know about it during the night before publication and many of them started to
learn about entrusted departments and learn how to manage them. Among the Czech intellectuals the talks go about it as about a “triumphal march of gray average”. Although it was constantly talked about the priority of education, without creating adequate conditions for it, the level of it did not have substantial influence on the quality of the structure of the personnel.

**The consequence of the lack of strategic governance was the policy of maintaining a certain de-innovation persistence.** The precedent generation of November 1989 with democratic ideals was replaced, at first, as a consequence of coupon privatization by the generation of money that at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century was transformed to a generation of social Darwinism. But slowly the constitution of a generation of the Euro predicted by the prognostics was carried out, i.e. the generation aimed at positive aspects of the integration process in the European Union and influencing it in favor of the Czech country, while more focused on strategic governance.

Substantial part of general public had little choice so for the enforcement of its basic requirements it used also coercive actions such as petitions, demonstrations but without violence, not against liberalism but against neoliberalism.

**The Czech Republic and the European Union**

This situation also reflected the relations between the Czech Republic and the European Union. Political elites were once reserved towards the Brussels, they were against further federalization and the Lisbon Treaty was beyond their tolerance, whilst another time they wanted to participate more in the development of the EU, but due to lack of clarity of the development prospects of the CR, they were not able to significantly influence the proceedings in the EU. In other words, we have not managed the policy towards the EU except for several engaged individuals.

This development initially moved the CR to the edge of events, to the position of a grumbler, a voluntary insulator, even a dead head who required despite generally accepted plans the exceptions as it was in the case of putting off the approval of the Lisbon Treaty, human rights, taxation of a bank system, etc.

We supported such a policy despite a significant rise of the actors of the world course of events – not only the USA and China, but also Russia, India, Brazil and other countries that could be competed only by a unified federalized EU, respectively Europe as an aggregate which was decelerated by some countries such as the CR. The relation of the CR to the EU and the ability to influence more the proceedings in it started to improve only before the year 2030. The security of the country, after the transformation of the NATO into TASC was based more and more on developing the European army and a new format of transatlantic security links.
Résumé

The riskiest approach to forecasting is the straightforward extrapolation of past trends. Forecasters would therefore do better to avoid it. The example of Czech history says: in the 20th century the country saw ten major changes of the social and political system, including a serious economic crisis with political and social impacts and the breakup of the joint Czechoslovak state. The Czech Republic's reactions to world affairs have been cautious. However, the country did support the formation of the European army, missile defense and the Trans-Atlantic Security Council (TASC) – a forum for political consultations on security issues between Europe and the US. From the perspective of 2030 it is already clear that the 2010s and 2020s have been only an extrapolation of the development between 1990 and 2010. After the crisis, the Czech Republic once again reached the annual GDP growth rate of 3.5% that it had had in the 2000s. In two decades it thus almost doubled its GDP.

At times, political power was being twisted to serve lobbyist purposes: laws were passed “on demand”, e.g. with the aim to obstruct activities strengthening democracy and standard political culture. This was opposed by that part of the public which identified itself with democratic and humanist ideals. Apart from the creeping resignation on ethical values, the country's development was retarded also by the absence of truly erudite politicians and the inability of the changing administrations to master the principles of strategic governance, i.e. governing and leading the country according to a long-term vision and strategic plans. The attitude of the Czech Republic toward the EU and the country's ability to influence intra-EU processes began to improve only during the 2020s and toward the end of this decade. After the NATO's transformation into TASC, the Czech Republic increasingly based its security on the existence of the developing European army and the new format of the transatlantic security links.

NOTES:


Literatura


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